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How much do ethics and genetics have in common? This chapter suggests that 
current understandings of ethics and of scientific, clinical and counselling work in 
genetics have common characteristics. More critical awareness of these common 
threads, and more attention to the social context would deepen understanding in all 
these disciplines and increase their efficacy. Underlying patterns of thought in social 
attitudes towards childhood and eugenics will be considered, to show how ethics and 
genetics reflect and reinforce such attitudes.  
  The example of Robert illustrates how attention to the social context can easily be 
lost. Robert had no physical or mental disability. However, his family lived in two small 
damp rooms and he often had ear infections. When he began to attend school, he was 
soon in trouble for not obeying his teacher, and for not learning or relating positively to 
other children, because his hearing had become so poor. Soon he was `kept in' during 
break times and he grew more lonely and restless. His parents began to `ground' him 
after school, and he became more sad and angry. The teachers started to talk of 
hyperactivity, fragile X and Asperger's syndrome, and referral to special school. 
Robert is one of many examples of how social conditions are reframed into supposed 
genetic ones.  
 
Policy from the past 
 
Today's health services for those affected by genetic conditions can have great 
benefits as amply illustrated through this book. However, a darker side of genetics is 
linked to trends from the past which, although now less consciously and publicly 
followed, can still be influential.  
  One typical example of its time, is a Medical Research Council (MRC) Report from 
1932. The premise of the Report is that crime `indicates a congenital fault of mental 
organisation... a failure of the brain to function properly'. Menstruation is posited as a 
cause of insanity and crime `attributable to irritation of the ovaries or uterus, a disease 
by which the chaste and modest woman is transformed into a raging fury of lust'. 
Facial and other anomalies of the `criminal type' were thought to resemble `the 
Mongoloid or sometimes the Negroid', being morally and physically `peculiar'.  
  Psychologists quoted in the Report had examined numerous women prisoners, 
noting their abnormal genitalia, menstrual changes and `orgies' which included 
attempts to escape from prison. Many case studies of working class adolescents 
noted ugly and `fierce' features, the `marks of a hopeless moral reprobate'. These 
`very dangerous' girls, the MRC Report recommended, must be sterilised and 
permanently confined in colonies `under the guardianship' of psychologists who 
should be allocated `hunting grounds' in working class areas from which to select their 
cases.i 
  Are attitudes now very different? The 1990s are only an academic generation from 
the Report, because the experts quoted, such as Cyril Burt, were teaching in the 
1950s when many of today's professors were trained. Similar views pervade present 
society, on `problem adolescents', on `congenital faults' that are thought to affect 
morality and behaviour, on the importance of researching and controlling 
`abnormality', and on biology as destiny without reference to social influences. Overt 
misogyny and racism are far less respectable today, but prejudice against disability 
and difference is still pronounced,ii,iii and working class and black young people are 
greatly over-represented in psychiatric and penal systems.iv The following sections 
consider how current attitudes in genetics, ethics and society reflect or challenge 
those earlier views on inherited conditions.  
 
Today's attitudes towards childhood and adolescence 
 
Inevitably, genetics is influenced by its social context, including attitudes towards 
babies and children. Our society is somewhat hostile to children. Of course, there are 
many loving relationships between adults and children, as there are loving 
relationships between individual black and white people. But just as there are racist 
structures in society, there are also ageist ones set against young people. Ageism is 
almost always discussed in relation to old people. We do not even have a word for 
`childism', possibly because it is so endemic and accepted that it is rarely noticed.   
  Here are a few examples of numerous negative responses to young people. 
Governments that have ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of 
the Childv report regularly on their progress to the UN. The UN was very critical of the 
British government for its many failures to respect and protect children.vi In over 300 
pages, ways are documented in which law, policy and practice in the UK have to be 
changed if standards are to meet those in the Convention.vii Problems for young 
people are increasingviii and one common theme is exclusion from mainstream 
society: increases in school exclusions, homelessness, and unemployment among 
young people; rising suicide rates among young men; one in three children living in 
poverty; cuts in benefits for young people; fear of strangers and dangers keeping 
children away from public places. 
  A revealing measure of public opinion is the political parties' manifestos, advocating 
policies which they believe will attract the most votes. The two main British parties 
emphasise measures to control and punish young people, such as a proposal (June 
1996) for an evening curfew for everyone under a certain age, although the vast 
majority are not criminals. Young people are constantly criticised and derided in the 
mass media, and tend to be stereotyped as either victims or villains, instead of being 
seen as the complex and often competent individuals they actually are. Adolescence 
is usually framed as a `problem' age, as if this is a biological inevitability. It is not 
certain that teenagers really experience more problems than other age groups, and 
the problems they have can more clearly be traced to social structures than to their 
personal qualities or physiology.ix,x  
  Another exclusion is in social research. Children are hidden inside `the school' or 
`the family'; adults' views about them are surveyed but we know almost nothing about 
children's own views and experiences.xi In Western societies concerned with cost 
rather than value, children tend to be seen as expensive dependents, a threat or a 
nuisance.xii Anthropologists find that abortion and active child abuse, which includes 
unrealistic demands for `the perfect child' and excessive pressures on children to 
succeed, are endemic in wealthy societies. In contrast, passive inadvertent child 
neglect and infanticide through poverty is endemic in poorer societies where children 
are loved in less conditional ways.xiii Different treatment of children and attitudes 
towards them arise from deep assumptions about differences between adults and 
children. Human beings are divided into two unrealistic extremes, with the left side 
column (in figure 1) assigned to children and, until recently, to women, and the right 
 
 3 
side to adults and especially professionals. 
  Trends in attitudes towards children and teenagers, with the `them-and-us' 
opposition between adults and younger people, have been summarised because 
these can influence values and policies in genetic research, practice and counselling. 
If, however unconsciously, children are seen as a threat or a drain on market 
economies and on adults' freedoms, children with genetic impairments are likely to be 
viewed still less favourably. Such attitudes can then generate and licence 
programmes to prevent the birth of impaired children, and to control teenagers and 
young adults who carry certain traits and disorders.xiv Arguably, to divert billions of 
dollars and accompanying public concern and hope into genetic research and away 
from social research and reform, detracts from addressing the real problems of young 
people.xv  
 
Figure 1.  Assumed child-adult dichotomies 
 
Genetic research is presented as a means of furthering children's interests in the 
future through the development of gene therapy. The newsletters of self help 
associations concerned with genetic disorders celebrate research as liberating 
children from extremely distressing conditions and their siblings from passing on 
disorders to their own children. Yet how much are these reports intended to further 
researchers' interests and to increase their funding, support and prestige? 
Researchers assume that they serve the families' interests, but when genetic 
knowledge is used mainly to detect and end affected pregnancies, the benefits to, for 
example, people who have muscular dystrophy, are less clear. When asked, people 
usually say that they would rather have some life than none at all. There is a tragic 
contradiction in the newsletters between reports which celebrate the lives of affected 
children (when they win medals and awards or go to university) and reports which 
support research primarily used to prevent their lives. The research may detect a 
relevant gene long before any `treatment' other than termination in pregnancy is 
available. Disabled people are concerned that by the time a treatment is developed, so 
few of them will have survived prenatal screening programmes, and the few that do so 
are likely to be so stigmatised, that investment in developing `cures' will no longer be 
considered worthwhile. It is probably more economical and efficient to select 
unaffected embryos for in vitro fertilisation, rather than to try to tamper with genes after 
conception. In any case, whilst gene manipulation for disorders such as cystic fibrosis 
or muscular dystrophy will not necessarily alter the person concerned, with other 
disorders this may not be so. Is Down's syndrome or fragile X an essential part of the 
`actual' person? Who would they be without these conditions? Is the ethical and most 
rewarding approach to these conditions a social rather than a scientific one: to accept 
affected people as they are and as valued members of society? 
  Main questions arising from a realistic view of social attitudes towards children in 
late twentieth century Western society are: How much do current attitudes towards 
children licence the human genome programme? And how much does the 
programme, with many other factors, affect attitudes towards children?  
 
Research about childhood 
 
Current social research about childhood has three main areas.  
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  i)  Analysis of popular and academic theories of childhoodxvi shows how philosophy 
and developmental psychology are misled, for example, by pre-Darwinian notions of 
evolution,xvii by scientists' personal fantasies,xviii and by inaccurate assumptions, such 
as those in figure 1. Scholars are gradually unravelling and refuting such theories. 
  ii)  Large scale studies of children's social and economic status report much 
disadvantage and exclusion.xix  
  iii) Small scale surveys of individual children's views and experiences demonstrate 
that they have greater capacities than has generally been assumed.xx,xxi  
  The extensive research literature on childhood presents an intellectual challenge 
(inviting us to rethink numerous influential fallacies and to reexamine realities) and 
also an emotional challenge. Initially, people tend to be angry and anxious when their 
deepest assumptions about childhood are questioned.  
  Perhaps inadvertently, ethicists and geneticists tend to assume and thereby to 
reinforce discredited theories about children's incapacities and limitations.xxii This is 
shown in debates about children's consent to genetic tests, when historical beliefs, 
instead of being critically examined, are quoted to justify future policies.xxiii Ethicists 
accept refuted theories about children's limitationsxxiv,xxv and question their status as 
human beings and even the value of their lives.xxvi In both disciplines, when the 
human intellect is highly valued inevitably, even if inadvertently, professional and 
academic thinking implicitly undervalues the lives of young and disabled people of low 
intelligence. 
  Troubled by the animal aspects of human nature, ethicists have pursued two 
simplistic and unsatisfactory alternatives.xxvii One is to perceive `real' humanity as 
mainly consisting in our spiritual and intellectual aspects, the body being regarded as 
a problem. In this view, young children risk being classed as animals rather than 
humans, and forfeit their human rights. Childhood is seen as a long apprenticeship in 
becoming human, and even young adults' morality is still sometimes reduced to 
biological terms. For example, in 1996, a psychiatrist wrote a leader (which is 
supposed to summarise the most up-to-date conclusions) on `Teenage sex' in the 
British Medical Journal. She alleged that unreliable use of contraceptive may be 
attributed to `cognitive immaturity'. `We know that the frontal lobe of the brain, which 
deals with control of sexual drives as well as abstract reasoning and planning, is not 
completely myelinated until 14 or 15 years of age. Major changes in cognitive ability 
occur between early and late adolescence, most notably the capacity to reason 
abstractly, predict future consequences, and see things from different 
perspectives.'xxviii  
  Genetics identifies with such reductionism in the attempts to improve and `perfect' 
the body, to trace the origins of behaviours such as violence to bodily material rather 
than to the mind or relationships or the social context, and to assume that people 
generally would prefer to select for high intelligence. Another response is to 
emphasise animal aspects of human nature in a negatively `brutish' image of irrational 
humanity, and to stress the need to control this, such as through contract theory,xxix 
risk management,xxx and market forces instead of altruism.xxxi 
  Contracts which are appropriate in business deals between strangers now invade 
personal relationships. Marriage is no longer acceptance `for better, for worse, in 
sickness and in health'; it is becoming more like a business contract with a growing 
number of conditions, including checking out potential partners' genes. The 
parent-child relationship is perhaps the only remaining human relationship of 
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unconditional acceptance, though this is increasingly provisional and intolerant, from 
pre-childhood in parents' antenatal choices to the end of childhood as growing 
numbers of homeless young people illustrate.  
  Although it is only one of many social movements, arguably genetics plays a key 
part in this move to redefine human relationships as contracts.xxxii In promoting 
`parental choice', genetics not only makes selection and rejection of potential children 
possible, it also presents such choice as morally acceptable, even desirable and 
responsible, though until 30 years ago abortion was illegal in Britain and considered 
reprehensible. 
  Frequent reference to parents' guilt about passing on genetic defects represents a 
change away from former religious and fatalistic views about inheritance and human 
nature. It further implies that we `ought' to pass on `high' standards of mind and body 
to our children, and expect high standards from them. Standards of what it counts to 
be acceptable human being are rising, as more genetic conditions are identified for 
which prenatal choices can be offered.  
  The `contract society' which emphasises formally negotiated and conditional 
relationships brings welcome new benefits and liberties, but also brings losses in trust, 
tolerance and security. Contracts, being essentially bargains between equally 
informed and voluntary agents for their mutual reward, especially disadvantage 
children. Knowledge and power (the elements of informed voluntary consent to 
contracts) are often unequally distributed between children and adults. To talk, as 
some ethicists do, of a contract between the fetus and the parent is to misunderstand 
the essentially equal nature of contracts. The infinite variety and subtleties of 
parent-child relationships elude definition and slip between the hard grid of the formal 
contract. The salient qualities in parent-child relationships largely concern being, 
rather than doing, but to set a contract about the kind of person a son or daughter must 
be turns the child into a kind of `super-pet'.xxxiii  
  Popular notions of the child as a net drain on resources, and a burden rather than a 
blessing, are extended in antenatal genetic services when it is stated or implied: 
`Children are so difficult to bring up (a telling phrase) that any extra defect or disability 
will make life hard, perhaps impossible, for the parents.' The assumption that life with a 
disability is too great a burden for a family to bear can implicitly over-estimate the 
biological effects of disabilities and under-estimate the social measures which help 
severely impaired people to lead a fulfilling life. It can express overt hostility to 
disabled people, or covert hostility in presupposing that society will reject them. 
  Some laws in Europe are moving away from seeing children as their parents' 
property, towards respecting children, and allowing parents to have rights only in so 
far as this enables them to fulfil their responsibilities.xxxiv However, genetics is moving 
the other way in its emphasis on parents' choice, their right and ability to select and 
reject potential children,xxxv and their right to know and publicise personal and 
sensitive information about their child.xxxvixxxvii  
  Many geneticists and counsellors believe that they simply respond to society's 
demands for testing and screening, and that morally they are reactive rather than 
proactive. Yet by virtue of their relatively high status, derived from their alliance with 
scientific and innovative medicine, wittingly or not, they strongly influence public 
opinion, collectively through the mass mediaxxxviii,xxxix and individually when 
counselling new clients.xl The antenatal period is an impressionable time for future 
parents, especially during a first pregnancy and for those with little experience of 
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children or of disability. Along with medical advice, clients absorb social and moral 
advice from professionals they see as experts in a prestigious specialty. A pattern of 
parental choice and notions of potential children as `perfect', acceptable or 
substandard products is promoted through antenatal screening. As consumerism 
overtakes former more fatalistic and religious world views, and colours the way society 
frames the questions raised by genetics, public policy, morality and science mirror and 
fortify one another in ways that currently are especially apparent with genetics. 
 
Genetics and eugenics 
 
Eugenics means `pertaining or adapted to the production of fine offspring, the science 
which treats of this'.xli The aims and net effects of genetics and eugenics are similar. 
For example, currently in Britain, spina bifida is diagnosed in about 1,000 fetuses each 
year, and about 900 of these pregnancies are terminated. Some adults with the 
condition argue that their lives are worthwhile and they criticise the current policy. 
  Because of its history, eugenics is usually dissociated from genetics by geneticists 
and ethicists. They argue that eugenics involved `state' coercion, whereas genetics 
takes the opposite approach in respecting and increasing personal choice. Yet when 
the social reality of the two approaches are considered in some detail, the abstract 
contrasts become less convincing. Diane Paul illustrates how eugenics has a public 
`front door' policy.xlii This involves an overt public policy, government programmes, 
and open appeal to people's patriotic obligations. If anyone resists the eugenic 
programme then there is obvious coercion which enforces compliance. The public and 
private benefits are much publicised. 
  In contrast, genetics has a `back door' approach when governments support 
eugenic practices in law and publicly funded hospitals, such as abortion of impaired 
fetuses and discouragement of `risky' conceptions. Yet in Britain there has always 
been some political ambivalence, linked to wariness about eugenics, towards abortion 
and infertility services, which have never been adequately funded or routinely 
provided in all districts.xliii Counselling services tend to be individual and semi-private 
(when compared with national nursing specialities). Clients are offered choice, and 
indirect persuasion through ` non-directive counselling' and values propagated through 
the mass media. The private benefits to the adults concerned are emphasised, and 
the discussion of the benefits to the state are confined mainly to medical journals. 
  In an abstract analysis, genetics and eugenics can look very different. However, in 
an analysis which takes account of the social context, it is immediately clear that the 
net results are the same: a highly organised national programme to ensure `the 
production of fine offspring'. The second `personal choice' approach can be seen as 
more effective than enforced eugenics. Power is less effective when people are aware 
of it, and is far more potent when people believe that they are choosing and not 
complying.xliv,xlv This is not to say, that individual and state interests are necessarily at 
odds, but that abstract analyses which ignore historical links can be misleading. 
  Antenatal screening and selection are claimed to be humane alternatives to 
infanticide which has been accepted in all societies. This argument begs questions 
about choices and choosers. Families on subsistence level have far fewer options 
about sustaining impaired babies, than parents have in wealthy societies with effective 
health services. The uncertain history of infanticide tells us nothing about the mothers' 
views, and whether they were consenting or distraught. Parents' grief at stillbirth and 
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infant death, which 40 years ago went unmentioned in medical textbooks, is now 
widely understood as an intense experience.xlvi Antenatal screening is not 
experienced by women as wholly beneficial.xlvii Concepts of percentile charts and 
measuring the fetus and child for `normal' growth are very recent. A `norm' meant a 
carpenter's set square until the late nineteenth century, when eugenicists began to 
apply to term to people.xlviii Although physical differences have always been noted, 
differences in mental ability appear to have been largely unnoticed before the 
eighteenth century,xlix and these alone would not show in the early months so would 
not be a case for infanticide. Measuring human physical and mental difference and 
attempts to correct and prevent difference are recent concerns.l The next section 
considers whether ethics dealing with abstractions or with everyday evidence 
contributes most to the moral understanding of genetics. 
 
Abstract or evidence-based ethics? 
 
The ethicist Daniel Callahan claims that the `blooming [sic] buzzing confusion' of 
actual experience `cannot be ordered or morally interpreted without the help of 
abstractions ... The aim of ethical theory is to provide us with some general, high-level 
abstractions that will help us to make sense of experience'.li Ironically, he quotes 
William James's notion of the ` buzzing confusion' which babies were supposed to exist 
in. Psychologists have since demonstrated babies' powers to make sense of 
experience and have concluded: `the buzzing confusion which William James once 
attributed to the infant's perceptual world lay not in [the infant] but in the our own minds 
and recording techniques.'lii So if babies can manage to make sense without benefit of 
abstract philosophy, cannot adults also? How essential is abstract philosophy to our 
understanding? 
  Callahan asserts: `We have all been better off standing firm, hanging on to our 
abstractions'.liii He illustrates his point with the example of `hard and exceptionless, 
highly abstract rules against ... racism' which have succeeded in `banning and 
forbidding' racism. He criticises sophisticated racists who plead for compromise `in the 
name of context, ambiguity, multiculturalism, sensitivity or whatever other version of 
moral complexity can be thrown into the breach against the devil of abstractions'. Yet 
who can believe that racism has been really banned, or that this can happen only 
through `hard rules' and not also through attention to personal experiences and 
beliefs?  
  All theories are imbued with values, and when ethicists or counsellors imagine that 
they can be `value-free', existing in some curious time and space warp, and suppose 
that thereby they can think more clearly and technically, they are more vulnerable to 
influence from subconsciously held values.liv Criticising abstract ethics, the 
philosopher Bernard Williams considers that it `makes people think that, without its 
very special obligation, there is only inclination; without its utter voluntariness, there is 
only force; without its ultimate pure justice, there is no justice. Its philosophical errors 
are only the most abstract expressions of a deeply rooted misconception of life'.lv 
Understanding depends on making the two approaches, which Callahan sets in 
opposition, work together. Yet Callahan seems to have set up a straw polarity, since 
he concludes by advocating `a working back and forth between our abstract principles 
and the actualities of experience.. The problem is not with abstractions as such. It is in 
knowing which to keep, which to modify and which to abandon'.  
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  Yet this begs the questions: Who are `we'? Who has authority to `change 
principles'? And how they will do so? The philosopher Mary Midgley gives a helpful 
analogy.lvi Schizophrenia (or any other condition which might be genetic) is like a 
mountain with tents set all around it. Each tent represents a discipline or way of 
understanding schizophrenia: psychiatry, history, anthropology, nursing, personal 
experience, poetry, ethics, religion, genetics, biochemistry, psychotherapy, and so on. 
Many of the tent dwellers acknowledge that their expertise offers only a partial view 
and they value learning from others. A few experts, Midgley names biological 
reductionists, illogically insist that only their tent can achieve the sole authentic view of 
the entire mountain and encompass or surpass all the other disciplines. Purely 
technical or abstract reasoning in ethics or genetics risks excluding numerous other 
relevant considerations. The next part of this paper considers ways of understanding 
genetics which take greater account of the complex social context. 
 
Reducing social into genetic concepts 
 
The neurobiologist, Steven Rose, criticises the way some geneticists try to reduce 
social concepts into genetic oneslvii In this kind of reductionism, dynamic processes 
become things, people's fluid transient reactions are seen as fixed entities, their many 
complex characteristics are separately identified as immutable parts of their character. 
Individual's reactions to other people and events, which make sense when seen in 
context, are viewed in isolation as `phenotypes' assumed to derive from their 
genotype, reducing the person to a mindless set of biological impulses. Inherited 
impairments are inaccurately called `handicaps' as if they solely determine the 
person's level of ability and opportunity throughout life. This fatalism ignores the 
powerful effects of social circumstances, and the ways in which personal and political 
action can transform impaired people's lives. Some one using a wheel chair may live a 
very limited handicapped life, or a very fulfilled one.lviii,lix  
  Steven Rose further considers how personal characteristics are reduced into 
impersonal concepts which are then seen as fixed (potentially or actually genetic) 
traits which drive the affected individual. This can encourage us to think in mechanistic 
ways about human beings. The cliche of a genetic `blue print' can imply that anatomy 
is destiny, that each person's entire life is mapped out from birth by the genes, like the 
design which determines exactly how an engine will be built, and that any deviation is 
incorrect. In contrast, `growth' suggests the unique individual branching out 
unexpectedly. In such biological determinism, free will, human agency, imagination 
and impulse are sidelined. Difference can too readily become `abnormality' to be 
avoided, rather than diversity to be celebrated.  
  The expectation that ethics and genetics can or should be value-free and 
non-directive, in itself expresses a set of values. Morality then tends to be seen 
aesthetically as `choices' and `personal values' which have no strong roots in social 
consensus or in their impact for good or ill. Reverence for individual choice, without 
specifying the nature or effects of choices, disguises how powerful people tend to be 
the choosers and vulnerable ones the losers. When there are discrepancies of power 
and knowledge, a neutral position is not possible.  When scientific and ethical 
expertise is valued much more highly than personal experience, such as living with the 
effects of genetic disorders, morality tends to take its meaning from abstract law and 
principles, philosophical or scientific ones, instead of from living relationships and 
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experience. People then tend to be seen less as creators of their own lives, and more 
as relatively passive consumers of services, and of life itself when they are offered 
prenatal choices. Risks which were once accepted or else undertaken in the 
expectation that resources and support would be found to cope with their effects are 
now presented as the responsibility of isolated individuals, to be reduced or avoided. 
Rather than learning partly through their own sensations and bodily experiences, 
people are encouraged to turn to scientific and moral experts to interpret to them their 
own subcellular activity.lx  
  When counsellors counsel in genetics, statistical risk and moral decision making, 
one measure of their effectiveness is change in their clients' behaviours. Professional 
and economic pressures combine with technological imperatives to act - to control, 
reduce, prevent, correct - to believe it is better to do something than nothing. This has 
been contrasted with a `feminine' approach of `holding' together a tension of 
opposites, a more `wait and see' ethos.lxi,lxii When ethics is linked with business 
management and risk calculation it is drawn into a similar ethos of control. This tends 
to put greater onus on any one who rejects decisive health interventions and, for 
example, decides not to abort a fetus with Down's, to justify their `inaction', although 
for the woman, to continue with the pregnancy, entails much more action than to end 
it. Common terms, such as `positive' results when impairment is found, increase the 
implication that doing `nothing' is negative. A genetic counsellor lecturing to midwives 
in 1996 said `occasionally we lose a Down's', meaning `occasionally a fetus with 
Down's is not detected prenatally and is born at term. This reverses centuries of 
midwifery values when `loss' meant death and not birth.   
  Some ethicists elevate science to a moral authority, basing their understanding on 
the science of genetics, instead of viewing it from a more independent critical position 
that sees science as one (very effective and important) type of knowledge among 
other types.lxiii Abstract ethics can reinforce the very weaknesses and problems in 
medicine that most worry people: impersonal reductionism, harsh utilitarianism, social 
control by experts who use confusing jargon, threats to the very freedoms which ethics 
purports to respect, a predominance of one discipline over all others, as the 
medicalisation or the ethicalisation of people's lives.  
  Genetics needs to be complemented and enriched by ethics that takes account of 
shared moral values including compassion, and respect with care on personal and 
political levels. Outward looking ethics considers the impact of decisions not only on 
the individuals concerned but on everyone who might be affected, such as everyone 
affected by a certain genetic condition and their place in society and the ways they are 
perceived and treated. 
 
Conclusion 
The specialist chapter in this book on law and ethics are very clear and elegant, with 
most useful and orderly summaries. They are like well organised kitchens where 
everything is allocated to the correct place. We know far more about a teaspoon when 
it is classified as cutlery and not mistaken for a tea bag. In contrast, attention to the 
social context can look messy and trivial. What is the point of taking out a teaspoon to 
look at it again? When the subject is not a teaspoon but, for example, a child with spina 
bifida, it is vital to review our own assumptions about children's needs and abilities, 
adults' responsibilities, the nature of genetic conditions and their actual effects, about 
what we know and do not know, and what we can learn from this child. People cannot 
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be tidied away like cutlery.  
  Greater attention to the social context, besides questioning current assumptions 
about childhood, can complement analysis in ethics and law and increase critical 
awareness of common threads between ethics and genetics. It can question covert 
assumptions that we are hostages to our biology rather than competent agents. By 
deepening understanding between all the related disciplines it can help to increase the 
richness and relevance of their various contributions to understanding of genetics. It 
can question trends towards seeing humans as machines, helplessly driven and 
looking for experts' solutions and technical answers. Social awareness sees how the 
parts inform and are informed by the whole, in each individual and in society. 
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Figure 1.  Assumed child-adult dichotomies 
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